

movement had been suspended at his instance. And so little were Gen. Halleck and the Secretary of War enlightened as to the true state of the facts at they urged the President to dismiss the two officers on whose information he had acted, as though the President, after he had made their opinions his own, could honorably punish them for giving him counsel which he had judged to be more reliable than that of all his other advisers put together. For he acted on the advice of Generals (Cochrane and Newton, without thinking it necessary to take either Gen. Burnside or Gen. Halleck or the Secretary of War into his confidence. The President doubtless knew how much the opinions of Gen. Halleck were worth in deciding a military question, but while the latter held the post of General-in-Chief he should have been treated with the terms of respect due to his office.

A few weeks later and Gen. Burnside resigned his command. Gen. Hooker was appointed to succeed him—the same Gen. Hooker who, when asked by the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War why the campaign in the Virginia peninsula had failed, did not hesitate to ascribe that failure “to a want of generalship in the commander.” The President, having tried in Gen. Burnside a man who had no confidence in himself, seems to have thought that it would be wise to try in Gen. Hooker a man who had no confidence in any body but himself. So Gen. Hooker was placed in command of the Army of the Potomac, though at that very time he was resting under charges from Gen. Burnside calling for his immediate dismissal from the army of the United States, on the ground of not having faithfully sustained his commander in some recent movements which Gen. Burnside had directed. When Gen. Hooker made representations to the effect that he had not been properly and loyally sustained by Gen. Burnside, the latter was subsequently relieved of his command and put on trial, which resulted in his dismissal from the army. When General Burnside made similar representations against General Hooker, and even called for his summary dismissal without trial, not only was Gen. Hooker not dismissed the service, but his accuser was relieved from command; not only was Gen. Hooker not relieved from command, but he was not even placed on trial; and not only was he not placed on trial, but he received a new proof of the confidence reposed in him by the Administration. It was the accuser in this case who was ousted from his command, while the accused saw promoted to take his place.

How poorly Gen. Hooker justified the favoritism thus shown him is read in the bloody record of the battle of Chancellorsville. Crossing the Rappahannock in the opening days of May, 1863, with a hundred and fifty thousand men, he was defeated by Gen. Lee with forty-nine thousand, and, after deplorable losses, retreated across the same river to find shelter in the entrenchments which he had left but a few days before.

Then ensued a long delay before Fredericksburg—at least it would have been called so under General McClellan, but it was not noticed under General Hooker—during which General Lee, finding no enemy with courage enough to confront him at that point, betook himself by slow and easy marches to Pennsylvania, which he invaded in the summer of 1863. In the very crisis of this daring movement Gen. Hooker was removed from the command of the Army of the Potomac, the President holding, it seems, that the apothegm which points a moral against the expediency of “swapping horses while crossing a stream,” has no application to Generals or to Cabinet officers, but is reserved exclusively for the benefit of a President “situated as he is circumstanced and circumstanced as he is situated.” General Meade took up the baton dropped by Gen. Hooker, and most worthily he wielded it from the day when he repulsed the army of Lee at Gettysburg down to the present time.

EX-PRESIDENT FILLMORE FOR MCCLELLAN. From the following correspondence it will be seen that Ex-President MILLARD FILLMORE, a true patriot and a wise and just President, has pronounced emphatically in favor of the nomination of the Chicago Convention for President and Vice President of the United States:

BUFFALO, SEPTEMBER 23, 1864.  
DEAR SIR: Your favor of the 25th has this moment come to hand, in which you request my permission to publish my letter to you of the 5th instant.  
That letter, like all letters of mine, was intended to be private; not because it contained any sentiment which I wished to conceal, but simply because I had a great aversion to its appearing in the newspapers; but you seemed to me its publication might do good to the conservative cause—in which I confess I feel a very deep interest—and as I have received similar information from other sources, I have reluctantly come to the conclusion to permit it to be published.

The fact is, that I see no reasonable prospect of a restoration of this Union—the object nearest my heart—without a change of the wronged policy of this Administration; and I see no prospect of changing that policy but by a change of the Administration itself. Hence I am for a change, and I look upon the election of Gen. McClellan as the best hope for the restoration of the Union, an honorable peace, and the security of personal liberty; and this you will publish to the world as my view of the pending crisis. But I shall enter into no argument in support of my opinion, nor do I intend hereafter to depart from that alone which I impose upon myself from an unwillingness to mingle, or seem to mingle, in party politics; for I do not consider myself as belonging to any party, and I feel wholly indifferent to any party success as such, and am only anxious for the honor and welfare of my beloved but bleeding and suffering country.

I am, in great haste, truly yours,  
MILLARD FILLMORE.  
F. H. CHURCHILL, Esq.  
BUFFALO, SEPTEMBER 5, 1864.  
GENTLEMEN: Please to accept my thanks for the honor you have done me by inviting me to be present at a national meeting to be held in Union Square on the 5th instant, and to address the meeting.  
While I shall with great pleasure cast my vote for Gen. McClellan and Mr. Pendleton, yet I regard myself as wholly withdrawn from party contests, and therefore I attend no political meetings, make no speeches, and write no letters for publication.  
With my best wishes for the success of your ticket—for on that, in my opinion, depends the salvation of our country—I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant.  
MILLARD FILLMORE.  
Messrs. F. H. Churchill, Henry W. Allen, Samuel Boardman, John P. Nagle, John Bailey, Jr., John H. Decker, Committee.

Gen. Sickles has declined a nomination from the Union party of the Ninth district of New York for Congress, as he has determined to ignore politics until after the war.

of the Council of War on the mind of the President, and thus to carry out the objects of those who had been insisting upon the removal of Gen. McClellan, lasted for four or five hours, during which time it was only interrupted by an occasional expression of the President, indicating his satisfaction and gratification at the many explanations of military movements contemplated, and which he had not before been able to comprehend.  
It was now getting dark. Mr. Stanton's questions indicated approaching exhaustion, and finding there was a silence which called for a cessation of hostilities on his part for the night, Mr. Lincoln expressed himself highly gratified with the interview, and he was impressed with the earnestness and intelligence of the officers present, and that he had every confidence in them. He was now determined not to remove Gen. McClellan, as he had promised to do, but that he should make his campaign, as approved by the Council of War, under restrictions, which he would make known on the following morning at ten o'clock, when he desired the presence of all of the officers of the council, and until after which time he desired that none of them should leave the city.

Before leaving the President, the Recorder of the Council approached the Secretary and said: “If you please, Mr. Stanton, permit me to have the proceedings of the Council of War, that they may be copied in a fair hand, and General Sumner, the President of the Council, will sign them, the Recorder will sign them, and they will then be in proper form.” “I’m just as good a judge of the form as you are,” was the reply of your friend. Other incivilities have been attempted by Mr. Stanton towards me, the manner and result of which he has neither forgotten nor forgiven, and which he may relate to you whenever he may feel so disposed.

On the following morning, at the appointed hour, when all of the officers of the Council of War had assembled, Mr. Lincoln said: “I have slept better than for two weeks. I feel relieved of an immense responsibility. I have determined upon the following programme, which he submitted verbally, and which was substantially as follows: “I will permit Gen. McClellan to carry out his campaign. He shall have sufficient force to defend the works before Washington. He shall embark fifty thousand men from Annapolis, and then, unless the batteries on the Potomac, which you assure me will necessarily be abandoned, are withdrawn or silenced, I shall reserve my authority to embark other troops.” He then said, “I have determined to divide Gen. McClellan's army into four corps, and I shall appoint the commanders of them.”

And afterwards he promoted the four officers who had opposed Gen. McClellan's campaign, three of whom he appointed to the command of corps, and with the exception of Gen. Franklin and Smith, who have been the subjects of constant annoyance and indignities since, the others have all been dismissed from the army.

The Peninsula campaign was proposed by Gen. McClellan whilst commander-in-chief of the army of the United States, and was intended to be made with the force then under his command in Eastern Virginia, estimated at over 200,000 men. It was so accepted by the President, and the movement was commenced upon that basis. Gen. McClellan had scarcely left Washington to take the field, when the Secretary of War relieved him of all the armies not under his, Gen. McClellan's, immediate command, and assumed command of them himself. The troops left in Northeastern Virginia were placed under the command of McDowell, Banks, Fremont, and Sigel, each being independent of the other, and of Gen. McClellan, and all subject to the order of Mr. Stanton. Whilst the above division of our army was taking place, the Confederates concentrated their forces, until, on the 26th day of June, Gen. McClellan found himself before Richmond with 55,000 men, (including McClellan's division), and was attacked by the concentrated Confederate force of 175,000 at the very moment when McDowell, under protest, withdrew his assistance from McClellan, by the orders of the President and Secretary of War.

The campaign under Gen. Grant did not commence until the 4th of May, 1864. That of Chancellorsville, in which the casualties of that army were estimated at thirty thousand men, and which, but for the Presidential killing of Stonewall Jackson, would have been annihilated, was planned by the President and Gen. Hooker, or, to use the President's own words, by “Joe and I,” of which the Secretary of War and Gen. Halleck were kept profoundly ignorant, and was not commenced until May 2, 1863; whilst that of the Peninsula, for the delay of which Gen. McClellan was so much censured, was commenced on the 25th of March, 1863, forty days in advance of either of the others.

Why this bitter enmity and persecution of Gen. McClellan? Why in the beginning of March was the President pressed to demand to remove him, even before he had made his first trial in command of the Army of the Potomac? Why did a distinguished member of the Senate on the 17th of March write to me: “The cry against McClellan is increasing; every effort is being made to crush him. What possible chance has Gen. McClellan to succeed when his own Government did everything in their power to embarrass his movements and break him down? One would think his task sufficiently onerous, laborious, and responsible, when, without experience, after the first disastrous rout at Bull Run, he reorganized the armies of the United States and was preparing to fight them, without the additional command being forced upon him at every step that his own Government were determined to crush him.”

I, Joe, you and I met within ten days after the dreadful battles before Richmond. You attacked Gen. McClellan with a bitterness and feeling that ill becomes a Christian gentleman. I then begged you not to break down Gen. McClellan until you had given him a fair trial, and until you had found a better man, and challenged you to name a better General. I now do the same thing, and appeal to the record of the past thirty months, and to the rivers of blood that have flown since, to sustain what I then asserted. I refer you to the opinions of foreign officers, and I assure you that among the old officers of the army I shall be fully sustained.

The preference of Gen. McClellan for the peninsula campaign and the condemnation of the President's plan have been fully sustained. The families and friends of the one hundred and thirty thousand men lost south of the Rapid-Ann since the 4th of May last proclaim it every where. Mr. Stanton told the country at that time he had a hundred thousand men more than he wanted, and now he tells you he wants a hundred thousand more men.  
Gen. Grant crossed the Rapid-Ann with an army variously estimated at from one hundred and eighty thousand to 200,000. On the 1st of September our forces were estimated, exclusive of Sheridan's 30,000, at 50,000. Gen. Lee had on the Rapid-Ann, after he had concentrated his army, 100,000. Beauregard joined him at Richmond with his forces from the South, which, with those near Petersburg, amounted to 30,000. Breckinridge brought 10,000. And Lee was reinforced probably 30,000.  
Making in all 155,000.

On the 1st of September his forces were estimated, at Richmond, at 45,000. Exclusive of Early's command, 30,000. Showing the discharges and loss from Grant to be 150,000. And that of Lee to be 85,000.  
Judge Kelley, were the records of the Council of War and that of “the strict course of examination” made by Mr. Stanton, indicating the very difficulties and dreadful losses Gen. Grant has lately sustained, ever placed before him? And why not? And who is responsible for the one hundred thousand men unnecessarily and wickedly sacrificed south of the Rapid-Ann, in the experiment made to prove that Gen. McClellan and the Council of War were wrong and that the President's plan was right?

The army of the United States, as you found it at the commencement of this war, was composed of a high-toned, intelligent, honorable, gallant set of men, fully equal to the contest before them; they had always studiously avoided all political connections; many of them had been thirty years in the service of their country and had never voted. They held their country and the honor and integrity of it before every other consideration. Had a road been adopted requiring that no political subject should be introduced into the army, but that all political rights should be respected, and had army officers only been held responsible for the conduct of the war, it would have terminated long ago.

Why have McClellan, and Sedgwick, and McPherson, and Bayard, and Franklin, and Buell, and Meade, and Averill, and Porter, and a score of other general officers, with hundreds, if not thousands, of officers of an inferior grade, been offended and held back, and many of them dismissed from the army without a word of explanation, an arbitrary act unknown in Great Britain, whilst Pope, and Burnside, and Hooker, and Butler, and Hunter, and Banks, and Sigel, and Sickles, and hundreds of others, certainly no better than the former, have been preferred? Why was Gen. Stone, than whom there is not a more loyal man, and accomplished gentleman, and gallant soldier in the country, confined in prison fifteen months? And when released by an act of Congress, why was it that neither the President, nor Secretary of War, nor Secretary of State, nor other persons at Washington would assent to any knowledge or any participation in the arrest? Such outrages are calculated to break down the honor and esprit de corps of any army, and all have looked on with disgust and horror and pain at the shameful injustice and outrages that have been continually heaped upon so many of their old friends and comrades in arms, whom they know incapable of an ungentlemanly, dishonorable, unsoldierly, or disloyal act.

Why did the Committee on the Conduct of the War investigate and falsify with such nice precision the conduct of McClellan and his friends, and overlook the volumes of charges filed in the War Department against Fremont, and Sigel, and Hunter, and others, and entirely overlook the immense slaughter at Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg and south of the Rapid-Ann? Why did a secret political inquisition, with no other pretext than that they suspected him of political ambition, sit over five hundred days and manufacture over seventeen hundred pages of *ex parte* testimony against a young officer, a Christian gentleman, an honest man, who, Heaven only knows, never had but one purpose, and that to serve his country and his God?

Corps carried the works on the right of the negroes, thus giving us the entire outer line of rebel defences on this side of Richmond. On the left of the Tenth Corps Foster's division came up rapidly and charged twice on the second line of rebel works, but did not succeed in effecting a lodgment within them; though they maintained the position they had gained on the first line.  
The result of this fighting may be summed up in the statement that we gained possession of the enemy's outer line of works from about a mile and a half from the river opposite Drury's bluff to a point on the Central road nearly due north from there, while Kautz's cavalry division penetrated along the Central road to within two miles of Richmond.

The object of the cavalry reconnaissance was to ascertain the rebel strength, and it is said that they found the rebel line defended by an adequate force. On the right of the Eighteenth Corps, where the second division was compelled to retire from the rebel works, the rebel gunboats were brought into requisition, and operated effectively to protect their line against our assault.  
The third division of the Eighteenth Corps, which had the right of that corps, charged and succeeded in carrying the rifle-pits of the rebels' outer line in their front with but little loss to themselves.

The heaviest loss incurred was in the second division of the Eighth Corps, and in Payne's negro division of the Tenth Corps. This latter division charged half a mile across an open field without firing a shot, and carried the rebel works at the point of the bayonet. As was to have been expected from the fact that they were so long exposed to the rebel fire, their loss was very heavy, and a large number of their dead are still lying on the field today.

The aggregate loss in the Tenth Corps is between 1,000 and 1,200, and in the Eighteenth between 500 and 1,000 killed, wounded, and missing. Of this number about 200 were captured, 800 wounded, 600 killed, and the remainder not yet accounted for.  
Behind the works captured the enemy have two very strong lines, defended by double rows of abatis, and mounted with heavy guns, the capture of which, if attempted, will require a long and arduous siege, and be attended no doubt with an immense sacrifice of life. Still, from the present disposition of our forces, it would seem that even these difficulties are not regarded as insurmountable, or as being an insuperable obstacle against the approach of our troops.

OPERATIONS OF THE LEFT WING.  
IN THE FIELD BEFORE PETERSBURG.  
October 1, 1864.

The portion of the army to which I have recently been attached, the left wing, had, pursuant to orders, been in readiness for several days to move against the enemy's works when the auspicious moment should arrive; in other words, when the troops which had crossed the James had made the initiative attack. A reconnaissance on our front, in the direction of the Southside railroad, was made yesterday by Gregg's cavalry, which developed the fact that the enemy's picket posts were on the Vaughan road, their headquarters being at a little chapel known as Poplar Spring Church; further that the rebel blockaded the road a short distance beyond the church at a point where it passed through a species of bayou.

Today, about noon, our entire attacking force moved from the works of the Fifth Corps and approached the enemy's position by different roads. The greater portion of our line being obliged to swing around some miles to the left in order to evade the swamps on our right front. The left troops engaged were a portion of those which moved along the Vaughan road, comprising the Sixteenth Michigan, the Forty-fourth New York, and the One hundred and Eighteenth Pennsylvania, under command of Col. Gwynn, of the latter regiment. The division to which they were attached, Gen. Ayres, found the enemy rather nearer our front than they had been discovered by Gregg, but in small force only. They were quickly driven back, following the road until they had passed the bayou of which I have spoken, when they passed to the right through an open country, where our attacking party arrived.

Here it was discovered that through this open space the enemy's position by different roads. The greater portion of our line being obliged to swing around some miles to the left in order to evade the swamps on our right front. The left troops engaged were a portion of those which moved along the Vaughan road, comprising the Sixteenth Michigan, the Forty-fourth New York, and the One hundred and Eighteenth Pennsylvania, under command of Col. Gwynn, of the latter regiment. The division to which they were attached, Gen. Ayres, found the enemy rather nearer our front than they had been discovered by Gregg, but in small force only. They were quickly driven back, following the road until they had passed the bayou of which I have spoken, when they passed to the right through an open country, where our attacking party arrived.  
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AN ATTACK ON OUR LEFT.  
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.  
October 2, (Sunday)

The enemy attacked Gen. Ayres' division yesterday morning, and were repulsed with heavy loss. This was the only fighting which took place on the left yesterday, with the exception of an attack by Hampton's cavalry on Gen. Gregg, on the Vaughan road. The enemy were driven back with considerable loss and some prisoners. Our loss was very slight. The enemy is now strongly entrenched and a battle may occur at any moment.  
Our loss in Friday's fight is not yet definitely ascertained, but will not vary much from what was stated in yesterday's letter. The enemy claim to have captured a number of prisoners from the Ninth Corps on that day. Our troops took some thirty prisoners yesterday, among whom is a lieutenant belonging to Gen. Bonham's staff.  
A heavy rain has prevailed all day, and hindered movements to a considerable extent.

THE ENEMY HAVE FALLEN BACK TO THEIR MAIN LINE OF WORKS.  
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.  
October 2, 1864—Evening.

No fighting has occurred on this line today. The enemy fell back this morning to their main line of works, which runs from the Lead Works to the Southside road, or near it. This position is a very strong one, and cannot easily be carried.  
A division of the Second Corps advanced to the Boynton road, over which the enemy wagon their supplies to Petersburg. Two lines of works were found unoccupied, only a skirmish line opposing the advance, and falling back as our troops went forward. Near the Boynton road very formidable works were found, behind which the enemy were posted in heavy force. It was not deemed advisable to attack, and they fell back and occupied a safe position. They lost a few wounded in the advance.

Our loss on Friday was greater than at first stated. The total killed, wounded, and prisoners fell out not far from two thousand, more than half of whom were taken prisoners. This occurred in consequence of a gap being left between a part of the Ninth and Fifth Corps, through which the enemy charged and flanked the second division of the Ninth Corps.

THE REBELS IN MISSOURI.  
Great Excitement Caused by the Rebel Invasion—Military Blunder—Rebel Movements, &c.  
Correspondence of the New York Tribune.

ST. LOUIS, SEPTEMBER 29, 1864.  
Price's invasion has created a tremendous excitement in this city, caused by an apprehension that the rebels meant to attack all our forces in the fall if they can and make a dash on St. Louis. The city is by no means in a state of ease; people come and go as usual; the railroads to the East depart and depart regularly; the streets about the same, and no stranger is molested or made afraid on the street. Even the militia guards, which in former times demanded your pass or certificate of exemption on the corners, have not made their appearance. But business is suspended, all stores closed, and organization of companies and regiments progressing rapidly. There are several thousand militia at Camp Sheridan, (site of the former Camp Jackson), a battery of artillery is frowning upon Lucas square in the city, the fire and drum is heard every where, and the scenes at headquarters are busy. All these indicate something unusual, and among those who know nothing of the real situation there is really considerable alarm.

There is plenty of good evidence that the rebels have promised themselves a dash into the city. All their movements since they arrived east of Pilot Knob have been directed to getting between the city and Gen. A. Smith's forces at De Soto. They tore up the Iron Mountain railroad and burned the South Big River bridge on Tuesday, and then attacked our forces at Mineral Point. While these demonstrations were in progress, we suddenly hear that three thousand rebel cavalry have reached Richmond, a small town in Franklin county, a few miles directly west of De Soto. The latter place having become our principal military station after the withdrawal from Mineral Point, it was feared this morning that the next move of the rebels would be to strike the Iron Mountain railroad north of De Soto, and then continue their march toward Carondelet. But the report now current is that they have struck the Southwest Branch railroad near St. Clair, and are aiming to destroy the railroad bridge over the Meramec at Moccasin. But Price has evidently intended to try a dash into our city, if the chances favor it. The time when such a dash might have been successful has passed, and Price will now try and capture Rolla, where Gen. John McNeill commands, at the same time keeping up his attack on Pilot Knob.

Gen. Ewing continued to hold out at Pilot Knob at last accounts, against overwhelming odds. All his forces are in the fort, on the Arcadia road, while the rebels hold the town. They were very indignant because they found no military stores in the place, and recovered themselves consequently upon the hapless inhabitants. The fort held by Gen. Ewing mounts four columbads, 62-pounders, and six light field pieces. It is well supplied with provisions, ammunition, and water for a long siege, but the rebels have occupied Shepherd's Mountain, only one mile distant, which completely commands the inside of the fort, and they have got a variety of artillery into position already. The last report direct from Pilot Knob was to halt-pat twice o'clock on Tuesday, when the rebels were shelling the fort quite vigorously; but Gen. Ewing's losses were light. Parties who left the Big River Bridge yesterday state that heavy cannonading was heard as late as eleven o'clock yesterday. Under a full knowledge of the situation, several members of Gen. Ewing's staff, who remain in the city, think that it is highly probable the General has been forced ere this to surrender. [He abandoned the fort and escaped to Harrison Station, where, at the latest accounts, he was closely besieged.]  
By one of those unaccountable errors which now and then occur in military management, an order equivalent to an evacuation of Pilot Knob was given too late. Gen. Ewing's first instructions were to hold the position. Knowing the dangers that soon environed him, he asked for authority to abandon the place in a certain emergency. This request was bandied about between Gen. Smith and Rosencrans until it was too late. When the matter was finally referred back to Gen. Ewing with instructions to use his discretion, he immediately commenced the preparations to retire. All his commissary and quartermaster stores were loaded in three trains of cars, and the who's placed in charge of Capt. H. Garmon, Ewing's quartermaster. Capt. Garmon brought off the trains safely, but hardly crossed the South Big River bridge five minutes ere the rebels appeared and applied the torch. A telegraph officer smuggled out of Pilot Knob on Tuesday P. M., and he is the last person known to have left the place. The rebels have entire possession of the railroad from Pilot Knob to the South Big River bridge.  
A fight at Mineral Point, on the railroad, took place on Tuesday afternoon. A brigade of Gen. Smith's corps was attacked by the rebels. The attack was repulsed, but our forces subsequently withdrew to the North Big River bridge. The rebels lost nearly fifty, our loss but seven. The attack was by cavalry. Indeed all their movements thus far have been made by cavalry. The only infantry accompanying Price is used as an escort to a wagon train carrying supplies for the army.  
The rebels have captured Potosi, one of the oldest settlements in the State and the county seat of Washington county. The attacking force numbered nearly six hundred, to resist whom there were thirty soldiers and one hundred and thirty armed citizens. The latter did after the first fire, and the soldiers, save three, were captured and killed by the rebels. The county records and a large amount of valuable private property fell a victim to the rebels.  
Decidedly the most horrible affair that has been recorded for many years is the atrocious massacre of soldiers and citizens on the North Missouri railroad, at and near Centralia, by a gang of bushwhackers under the infamous Bill Anderson, whose cruelties upon Union men in Carroll, Boone, Howard, and other counties, have been heretofore mentioned. This time Anderson even eclipsed the butcher Quantrill. His gang numbered about one hundred and twenty-five men. They had been chased out of Monroe county, and suddenly made their appearance at Cent. alia, on the North Missouri railroad. The postmaster at Mexico, the next station, Mr. J. J. Hines, furnishes an account of what followed. He says: “The citizens at first took them for the State militia. Shortly after their arrival a gravel construction train came along, which was seized and stopped. A few minutes later the passenger train from St. Louis arrived, which they also immediately seized. Three civilians, who made some resistance, were shot in the cars, and either killed or wounded, and were left on board. The other passengers, including between thirty and forty soldiers, were all ordered out of the cars and plundered of all their money and valuables. As soon as the stripping was completed the vile marauders commenced firing upon their captives, the unarmed soldiers, some of whom attempted to escape by running into the houses along the route. Two or three were pursued and shot down like wild game. Twenty-four of these soldiers were shot; butchered, seven of whom were of the First Iowa cavalry, stationed at Mexico, and ten of whom were discharged soldiers, veterans returning to their homes from Atlanta, after a faithful three years and four months' service in the cause of their country. The four months' service in the cause of their country, the four months being extra service, generously given by them to the Government. After these men were thus hunted and shot down their bodies were beaten, their heads cut off or backed with swords, and every possible indignity inflicted upon them. Mr. Holland, express agent at Centralia, was also among the killed. The murderous work having been accomplished, the torch was applied to the depot, and the train, containing the three wounded civilians, was fired by running into its way the wood pile. It ran about six miles when it stopped and was slowly consumed.  
The band then passed on, and in about one hour was followed by Major Johnson and his command. Two or three miles beyond Centralia, in Boone county, the men of a Mr. Fullenweider, who the citizens of Anderson had his men in the bushes, and awaited his pursuers. Major Johnson approaching the ambush, was fired upon. He immediately withdrew his command, dismounting them, and formed in line of battle. At this moment the general burst from their hiding place, and was twice shot and killed. Major Johnson's horses took fright and left him and his men to wage the unequal contest on foot. They had delivered but one volley when the guerrillas were upon them, shooting, hacking, and slaying to the right and left. The militia made no stand, scattered and fled in all directions. Eighty-six of their number, including Major Johnson, were killed in the very field where they were taken. Ten others were found dead in the prairie toward Centralia. Out of the whole command of about one hundred and fifty men, twenty-five were all that up to our latest advices had escaped.”  
The end is not yet. It is war to the knife. Price's friends have raised the black flag—let them abide the issue—the consequences are fearful—blood will flow like water, but how it must.

POSITION OF GEN. CASS.  
From the beginning of the secession movement in the South, and during the whole course of the war, it is known that the venerable Gen. Cass has most zealously sustained the cause of the Government against its armed enemies. It having been represented that this distinguished statesman had declared his intention to vote for Mr. Lincoln at the coming election, we take pleasure in reproducing the subjoined letter, which sufficiently disposes of this unfounded rumor:  
DETROIT, SEPTEMBER 28, 1864.  
DEAR SIR: The state of my health has confined me to the house for some months, and prevents me from accepting your invitation to attend the meeting this evening at the McClellan Club of the First Ward. But I avail myself of this opportunity to say that I approve the nomination of Gen. McClellan, and shall vote for him at the next Presidential election if able to attend the polls.  
Wishing that success may reward your exertions,  
I am, dear sir, respectfully yours,  
W. S. BIDDLE, Esq. LEWY CASS.